This paper analyses the liberalisation of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico since the late-1980s, and its relationships with exports and imports. Such a process has eased the access of multinational corporations (MNCs) to the country, which has promoted exports. However, it has also resulted in a higher import content and the displacement of local firms, which has limited Mexico's economic development through the balance of payments constraint. The analysis is supported by the existence of linkages -bidirectional Granger causality-between exports, imports and FDI.
The purpose of this paper is four-fold; firstly to examine the FDI liberalisation process in Mexico and to present a descriptive analysis of the performance of FDI;
secondly to address some of the adverse consequences of FDI on the Mexican economy;
thirdly to explore the causality relationships between FDI and exports and imports, and finally to conclude with a critical evaluation of the results from the perspective of Mexico's economic development. The effects of FDI can be far-reaching, with evidence that FDI impacts significantly on efficiency, employment, factor prices and trade. 1 In the case of Mexico, various studies have focused on the impact of FDI on labour productivity (Blomström and Persson, 1983; Blomström, 1988) , wages (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997) , and growth (Ramírez, 2000; Griffiths and Sapsford, 2003) . However, despite the rapid growth of both FDI and trade, the effects of FDI on exports and imports have not been extensively explored. There is one recent paper on the causal link between FDI and exports (Alguacil et al. 2002) , but the causality linkage between FDI and imports has not been studied at all.
The Liberalisation and Performance of FDI

FDI liberalisation
Over time, the deregulation of the Foreign Investment Law (FIL) has gradually reduced the range of activities reserved for the State or Mexican citizens. In particular, the reforms of 1989 and 1993 attempted to make the FIL compatible with the proposal for NAFTA. Further amendments to the FIL in 1995 FIL in , 1996 FIL in , 1998 FIL in , 1999 and 2000 accelerated the participation of FDI in Mexican economic activity.
From the evolution of the FIL, the most relevant issues must be pointed out.
Mexico's first formal statute to regulate, systematise and codify the rules and legal
principles on investment was the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate
Foreign Investment of 1973. In this Law, foreign investors were required to seek authorisation from the government; FDI was prohibited in services; financial restrictions included limits on the repatriation of capital; and, foreign firms were not allowed to access the national financial market. In 1989, the Law had a major relaxation, which was part of a set of market-orientated reforms designed to open the economy to greater foreign participation, specifically from the US. Mortimore (2000) the links between FDI and trade in automobile MNCs operating in Mexico became one of Mexico's principal means of integration into the international economy. 5 The maquila programme consists of special tariff preferences; raw materials can be imported in-bond duty free, manufactured, and then re-exported while paying duty only on the value-added in Mexico. 6 For instance, in 1998 automobile exports relative to the production of the 4 biggest auto MNCs was 68 per cent (see Table 1 ). (WTO, 1994a ). This agreement is based on the assumption that certain investment measures restrict and distort trade. Therefore, it prohibits countries from using traderelated investment measures (e.g. local content requirements, trade balancing requirements, etc.), which are considered inconsistent with the provisions of GATT 1994 on national treatment (Article III) and those forbidding the use of quantitative restrictions (Article XI) (WTO, 1994b) . The phasing-out period for developed countries was two years from 1 January 1995; developing countries had a transition period of five years; and the least developed countries had seven years.
Continuing with the liberalisation process of the FIL, it is relevant to mention that one of the most extensive amendments to the FIL was realised in January 1999, when the majority of financial services were liberalised. The government allowed 100 per cent participation of FDI in the financial sector, particularly in banks; and, railroad services and gas distribution were entirely deregulated.
In addition to the changes in the FIL, it is important to highlight that in 1994 the Mexican government changed the definition of FDI data, with the intention of making it consistent with that of the IMF and OECD. Before 1994, FDI included notified and authorised FDI to the National Foreign Investment Registry Office, which did not necessarily coincide with actual or realised investment (i.e. firms could have asked for authorisation of FDI without actually investing). Since 1994, FDI refers to realised new investment which includes: 1) amounts reported to the National Foreign Investment Registry Office; 2) provision of capital for new companies; 3) foreign investor trustfunds; 4) transfers of stock from nationals to foreigners, 5) imports of capital assets (fixed assets) by maquila firms; 6) ploughing back of profits by FDI firms; and, 7) the amounts involved in accounts between companies (debts and loans between parent companies).
Prior to 1994, FDI data were only available for the first three categories (INEGI and Secretaria de Economía).
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The modifications and amendments to the legal investment framework in Mexico were orientated towards trade and investment integration mainly between the US and Mexico (Blomström and Kokko, 1997) . Therefore, the argument of Graham and Wada (2000) that the reforms of the FIL were not related to NAFTA is groundless.
Beyond the amendments to the FIL, and the preference to North American investment given by the NAFTA agreement, the Mexican government has subscribed to several bilateral foreign investment agreements, mainly with European or Latin American countries, in order to promote foreign investment and to diversify the origin of FDI.
Mexico has bilateral investment treaties with Spain (1997), Switzerland (1998), Argentina (2001); and has unfinished agreements with: Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg, Cuba, Germany, Greece, Italy, South Korea, Sweden, and Uruguay (Secretaría de Economía). In spite of these numerous agreements the main source of FDI inflows continues to be the US.
FDI performance
The main motive for foreign investors to locate operations in Mexico is to take advantage of Mexico's location in order to serve the whole North American market rather than to serve the domestic market by itself (Agosin and Prieto, 1993; Twomey, 1996; Graham and Wada, 2000; Sargent and Matthews, 2001 ). The cheap labour in Mexico is another determinant that attracts US FDI flows to the country (Cimoli and Correa, 2002; Love and Lage-Hidalgo, 2000) . These factors explain why Mexico is among the world's largest recipients of FDI inflows and that, on average, more than 60 per cent of Mexico's FDI inflows come from the US. 7 In statistical work, it is important to take account of this change of definition of FDI in 1994. 8 This significant detail has not been identified by previous studies which have analysed FDI in Mexico and presented econometric results (e.g. Cuadros et al., 2001; Alguacil et al., 2002; Griffiths and Sapsford, 2003) . (% of GDP) 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Note: a Capital flows to Mexico are defined as equities, inter-company debt, and reinvested earnings. FDI with a negative sign suggests that at least one of the three components is negative and it is not compensated by the positive components. Source: US Department of Commerce.
Graph 1 Foreign Direct Investment Inflows
Looking at the sectoral destination of FDI flows into Mexico (see Table 2 ), it can be seen that they have been primarily channelled to the manufacturing sector (except in It is relevant to mention the contribution that FDI makes to Mexican exports. 
Backwardness associated with FDI
In general, the effects of FDI inflows might be expected to be positive for the Mexican economy because they have a direct impact on the productive sector. However, a more detailed analysis of the nature of the FDI inflows leads to a more cautious assessment. At least four caveats can be made. First, linkages between FDI and local industry are rather frail. It has been well documented that MNCs allocated in the manufacturing sector are poorly connected with domestic industry (Arestis and Paliginis, 1996; Dussel, 2000; Ruiz-Napoles, 2000; Mattár et al., 2002; Mortimore, 2000;  12 Máttar et al. (2002) mention that FDI has a strong presence in the Food, Beverages and Tobacco subsector, as a result of purchases of national enterprises and from added investment by MNCs already established in Mexico (i.e. PepsiCo, Nestlé and Coca-Cola). UNCTAD, 2002) . Mattár et al. (2002) argue that FDI has not led to an increase in fixed capital formation in the country as a whole; instead it has led to a division between an export-oriented sector linked to FDI on the one hand, and smaller indigenous firms focusing on domestic demand on the other. As reported by Mortimore (2000) , FDI in Mexico has resulted in an export platform, possessing little contact with the domestic economy, truncating and limiting the domestic industrialisation process. Dussel (2000) argues that FDI has increased the polarisation of Mexico's economy, reflected in regional differences in economic performance of the economy. The northern states absorb FDI because export activities are located in that area, while the south of the country lags behind the performance of the rest of the country.
Secondly, domestic industry has been weakened by imported inputs and competition from FDI. Mattár et al. (2002) conclude that the high import content of Mexican exports has increased due to the displacement and close-down of local firms that produced for the domestic and foreign markets but were unable to compete with MNC entry. 13 In relation to the high import content, the dominance of the maquila industry in export activities is a cause for concern. For instance, 54 per cent of manufacturing exports are produced in the maquila industry which uses only 2 per cent of local inputs. This type of exports hardly provides any net foreign exchange to finance other imports necessary for Mexico's technological progress and growth. Third, the agreements concerning FDI have effectively removed the ability of the Mexican State to intervene and protect indigenous industry (Blecker, 1996; Arestis and Paliginis, 1996) . Because of trade and financial liberalisation, embodied in NAFTA,
Mexico is unable to apply strategic industrial and trade policies for a successful outwardoriented development strategy that would guarantee a balance between the growth of exports and imports without constraining output growth in the long-run. There is very strong evidence that Mexico's growth is balance of payments constrained (Moreno-Brid, 1998 , 1999 , 2001 Ocegueda, 2000) , and that this constraint has deepened as a result of trade liberalisation (Pacheco-López and Thirlwall, 2004) . Although NAFTA has worked as a catalyst for attracting FDI and fostering exports (Lustig, 1997) , it has also generated serious difficulties for Mexico's economic development.
Fourth, it should also be remembered that FDI inflows associated with mergers, or any other sort of acquisitions of already existing assets, will only have a limited impact, if any, on the productive system or the trade sector (exports). This type of FDI would be a one-off foreign exchange contribution to the economy. For example, the acquisition of BANAMEX by Citicorp in 2001 accounted for 50 percent of FDI inflows during that year, but did not have a significant impact either on exports or output growth.
Causality relationships between FDI, Exports and Imports
Now we focus our attention on the causal relationship between FDI and exports, and FDI and imports, which could run in either direction. With regard to exports, initially, firms trade in the foreign market, and after learning more about the economic, social, political and ruling conditions of their trading partners they may establish a subsidiary in the host country (Liu et al., 2001) or they may embark on joint ventures with local enterprises. This implies FDI inflows, and, after some period, MNCs may start to export (UNCTAD, 1996; Rob and Vettas, 2003) . The role of MNCs in expanding exports in host countries derives from the additional capital, new technology and better management and marketing strategies that they can bring with them (UNCTAD, 2002). Thus, there may be a bi-directional causal link: exports stimulate FDI and FDI promotes exports.
Likewise, there are two possible bi-directional links between FDI and imports.
First, if imports are evidence that a market exists for a commodity, FDI might be attracted to the host country to produce that product locally. In other words, a rise in imports in the host country justifies investment and production by MNCs; thus, imports stimulate FDI inflows. Second, as soon as MNCs establish in the host country, they import certain types of supplies (basic components and intermediate goods produced by the headquarters) to satisfy the quality standards required by the international market; therefore, FDI inflows increase the demand for imports.
Methodology
We use the Granger causality methodology to test for the relationship between FDI inflows and exports, and FDI inflows and imports. In a bivariate framework, the variable x is said to cause the variable y in the Granger sense if the forecast for y improves when lagged variables for x are taken into account in the equation, ceteris paribus (Charemza and Deadman, 1997) . In other words, the standard Granger causality procedure is based on past changes in one variable explaining actual changes in another variable.
Testing causality, in the Granger sense, involves using an F-test (or Wald test).
The appropriate formulation of a Granger-type test of causality (which must be applied to stationary series) is:
where X is exports, FDI is foreign direct investment inflows, M is imports; µ t , ν t, , σ t , and τ t are error terms with zero mean. In equation (1), the null hypothesis 'FDI does not
Granger cause X' (θ 1 = …. = θ j = 0) is tested using a standard F-test (Wald test). It is rejected if the θs are jointly significantly different from zero. Similarly, in equation (2) Considering the ARDL model developed by Pesaran and Shin (1997) , an error correction model for each of the four equations is derived:
where ρ t-1 is the lagged error correction term obtained from the residuals in each equation (equations 1 to 4) and ε t is the random disturbance term. From equation (5) the null hypothesis that 'x does not Granger cause y' would be rejected if the lagged coefficients of the β xi 's are jointly significantly different from zero, using a standard F-test (Wald test).
In case of cointegration between x and y, changes in one variable towards its long run equilibrium value may be a result of variations in the other variable. As well, the causality between x and y could be identified if the error term (ρ t-1 ) is statistically significant.
Notice that the Granger test results only indicate that the changes in x must come before the changes in y (Murkherjee et al., 1998) . A statistically significant coefficient on ρ t-1 (π)
shows how the short run coefficients of the endogenous variable adjust towards the long run equilibrium in reaction to changes in the exogenous variables.
In order to obtain consistent results derived from the Granger causality procedure three steps are followed. The first step is to test the order of integration of the variables.
The second step is to test for cointegration using the Johansen maximum likelihood approach. Finally, the third step is to carry out the Granger causality tests.
Empirical Analysis
The tests are carried out on annual data from 1970 to 2000. The data source is the World Development Indicators (2002) . All variables are in real terms and are expressed in US dollars. Before we apply the Granger causality tests outlined in the previous section, it is necessary to determine the order of integration of the variables. The ADF test is used for this purpose. Table 4 (part A) reports the ADF (one lag) test for the log levels of the variables and first differences under the assumption of a constant and (part B) under the assumption of a constant and deterministic time trend. The ADF test results for unit roots confirm that all variables are integrated of order one in levels but integrated of order zero in first differences at the 5 per cent level of significance. In panel a), it is observed that when three and four lags are used in the procedure, the null hypothesis that LFDI and LX are not cointegrated (r = 0) is rejected using either the maximum eigenvalue test or the trace test at the 5 per cent level of significance. In other words, it indicates that there exists a unique cointegration vector among the variables involved. Similarly, for panel b) there is cointegration between LFDI and LM, when four, three and two lags are considered. Granger (1988) shows that if two variables are cointegrated, there should be a causal relationship between them in at least one direction.
Since the existence of cointegration between the variables is confirmed, the next step is to test for the causal relationships between FDI inflows, exports and imports. The literature offers different statistical methods to determine the optimal lags in Granger causality tests. The Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) were used to determine the optimal lag-lengths in the ARDL and error correction models. Table 6 shows the results, which point to some patterns for the Granger causal links between FDI inflows, exports and imports in Mexico. a A shift dummy, d94 (which takes the value of 0 prior to 1994, and 1 afterwards), was included in the ARDL model. The asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) denote significance at the 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.
From the first set of regressions there is evidence of bi-directional Granger causality between exports and FDI, either considering the Wald test or the error term. This is an interesting result, which is supported by the theory and previous descriptive analysis, because it suggests that the performance of exports stimulates more FDI inflows to the country, and also FDI inflows encourage exports. Our results are consistent with those found by Alguacil et al. (2002) . The second set of results support a bi-directional causality relationship between FDI and imports.
Two comments on these results may be made. First, as discussed in the literature, the Mexican government has followed the export-led growth model as a development strategy (Thornton, 1996; Abdulnasser and Manuchehr, 2000; Balassa, 1983; Alguacil et al., 2002) , where exports are promoted and stimulated by FDI. However, although it is true that there has been some upgrading of the type of Mexican exports, by means of MNCs' entry, it has not been enough to raise Mexico's sustainable output growth rate. Second, FDI has a close relationship with imports. Simultaneously as FDI has increased, the import content has intensified. As mentioned before, imports are demanded mainly to provide inputs for domestic and export products, and to incorporate technology to foster economic development. Thus, the orientation and allocation of FDI plays a major role in the determination of Mexico's trade balance and economic growth (Pacheco-López and Thirlwall, 2004) .
Conclusion
This paper has tried to counterbalance the euphoria relating to FDI inflows into
Mexico. The Mexican experience shows that the modifications in the legal framework that regulated FDI, which started in 1989, were orientated towards the facilitation of FDI inflows into the country. These reforms were deepened by NAFTA. The investment provisions of NAFTA and other concessions from the Mexican authorities to foreign investors show that MNCs greatly benefited, as they have gained larger shares of the international and domestic market by displacing indigenous firms. However, the alleged benefits should not be exaggerated. Although it is true that integration of Mexico into the world economy has been fostered by the export orientation of MNC, it should be recognised as well that the country has lost control in the design of its economic development. If Mexico is really committed to embarking on a process of stable long run economic growth it is imperative for the government to work towards the integration of the domestic industry and the export orientated sector; where the efforts should be devoted to the strengthening of local industries.
